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The Civil Rights Act of 1991's
Answer to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

After two years of intense political warfare, two presidential vetoes, and two failed veto overrides, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 (Act) finally became law on November 21, 1991. In
large part, the Act is a congressional response to a number of
recent United States Supreme Court cases, which many believe
have seriously threatened the vitality of civil rights in the work
place. To neutralize the perceived effects of these cases, the Act
explicitly modifies the holdings of no fewer than five Supreme
Court cases. 1 One of the cases modified by the Act is Lorance
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. 2 , the subject of this comment.
II. BACKGROUND
An employee that has suffered a harm recognized under
Title VII must strictly comply with the procedural steps outlined below.
First, the employee must file a claim of employment discrimination within 180 days 3 of the incident with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)4 or corresponding state agency. This is a rigid statute of limitations requirement that swiftly cuts off untimely filed claims.

1.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (modified by S.
174fi, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § lOfi (1991)); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490
U.S. 900 (1989) (modified by § 112); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989) (modified by § lOfi); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(modified by § 107); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (modified by § 108).
2.
490 U.S. 900 (1989).
:~.
A proposal to increase the statute of limitations for Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) violations from lRO days to two years was
eventually rejected. This extension would have brought the duration of the statute
of limitations applied to nonracially-based employment discrimination claims, 180
days, in line with the two year statute of limitations generally applied to raciallybased employment discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West
Supp. 1992). When this paper refers to the 180 day period, it is also making reference to the :iOO day period a claimant has to file his or her claim with the EEOC
when that claimant has first filed his or her claim with a state agency pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-fi(e) (198R).
4.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-fi(e) (1988).
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If 180 days have passed before a claim is filed, the employee can only preserve the claim by showing that the statute was
not triggered, the statute was tolled, or the continuous violation theory applies. 5
If a claim is properly filed, the EEOC will examine the
claim, negotiate with the employer, and eventually decide
whether it will get involved in bringing the dispute to court. 6 If
it chooses not to get involved in the suit, it will send a notice
informing the employee of his or her right to sue. 7 The employee is then required to formally bring an action in court within
ninety days of receipt. 8
Like the 180 day statute of limitations, this ninety day
period may be equitably tolled. 9 However, unlike the 180 day
statute of limitations, the continuing violation theory cannot be
relied upon. 10
These limitation periods are rigidly adhered to and must
be met in order for a court to hear a case on its merits.
III.

MODIFYING LORANCE

In Lorance, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of when the 180 ·day statute of limitations period
begins to run for Title VII employment claims of discrimination
when the alleged injury arises from an employer's seniority
system. The Court held that the 180 day statute of limitations
for seniority systems is only triggered once, and begins when
the system, insofar as it is non-discriminatory on its face, is
adopted.
Lorance has primarily been criticized for categorically
denying employees, hired more than 180 days after the adoption of the seniority system, the right to assert a claim against
an employer's discriminatory seniority system.
The disdain for Lorance was shared by members from both
political parties. 11 Therefore, the question was not whether

See discussion infra part III(D)(5).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(D(l) (1988).
7.
ld.
R
ld.
9.
See Rys v. Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 44::1 (1st Cir. 19R9); Johnson v. Postal
Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (lOth Cir. 1988); Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494
(Hth Cir. 19R8).
10.
Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959 (lOth Cir. 1991).
11.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 40(II), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694.
fi.

6.
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Lorance would be invalidated, but how it would be replaced. 12
A.

Facts and Holding of Lorance

Up until 1979, the length of an employee's plant-wide service was the basis for determining seniority at the AT&T facility where Lorance worked. 13 In 1979, a collective bargaining
agreement was reached which changed the basis of seniority for
"testers"-a job traditionally held by men-from duration of
plant-wide service to that worked as a tester. 14 In 1982, a
number of women, including Lorance, were demoted under the
new seniority system. 15 The demoted women alleged that they
would not have been demoted under the previous system based
on plant-wide service and that the new seniority system based
on time as a tester was adopted for the purpose of discriminating against women.
The Court held that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs from challenging the seniority system. 16 The Court reasoned that when a seniority system is nondiscriminatory on its
face, it is the alleged discriminatory adoption of the seniority
system that is the "occurrence" of the discriminatory practice
that triggers the statute of limitations. 17 Thus, the statute of
limitations was only triggered when the employment practice

12.
The initial Democratic version of the Act added the following paragraph to
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988):
Where a seniority system or seniority practice is part of a
collective bargaining agreement and such system or practice
was included in such agreement with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, the application of such system or practice during the
period that such collective bargaining agreement is in effect
shall be an unlawful employment practice.
136 CONG. REc. 81020 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990). The Republican Administration's
original version read:
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs when a seniority
system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a
seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by
the application of a seniority system, or provision thereof,
that was adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose,
in violation of the Title, whether or not that discriminatory
purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision.
136 CONG. REC. 81522 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990).
13.
490 U.S. at 901-02.
14.
!d.
15.
!d. at 902.
16.
!d. at 912.
17.
!d.
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was adopted in 1979, not when the women were demoted in
1982. Because 180 days had passed from the time of adoption,
the claim was time-barred.

B.

Reasoning of the Court

1. Redefining the continuing violation standard
In reaching its result, the Lorance Court first redefined the
so-called continuing violation theory. 18 Prior to Lorance, Delaware State College v. Ricks 19 and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans20 were the primary cases dealing with the continuing violation theory. Collectively, Ricks and Evans stood for the proposition that the continuing impact of past discrimination is not
actionable.
The Lorance Court redefined the continuing violation theory by incorporating the concept of "wholly dependant" into the
verbal formulation. The Court stated, "A claim that is wholly
dependent on discriminatory conduct occurring well outside the
period of limitations [cannot constitute] a continuing violation."21 Under the "wholly dependent" language, not only is
the continuing impact of past discrimination not actionable, but
also non-actionable is any event "well outside" the 180 day
statute of limitations that is wholly dependant on prior discriminatory conduct. By barring claims dependant on past
18.
The continuing violation theory is a mainstay in Title VII jurisprudence. It
allows an employee to file a claim that relates back to violation occurring before
the 180 day period, as long as one of the incidents of discrimination occurred within the 180 day period and the employer's action constitutes a "pattern of discrimination." The most difficult part of the analysis is determining what constitutes
a "pattern" and whether the incident occurring within the 180 day period is part
of that pattern.
19.
449 U.S. 250 (1980). In Ricks, a university teacher was denied tenure.
Ricks was permitted to stay for a year beyond the time that tenure was denied.
Ricks brought suit when he was let go. The Court held that the statute of limitations began to run when the decision to deny tenure was communicated to Ricks.
The eventual termination of employment was the "effect" of the denial of tenure
and was neither a discriminatory occurrence nor an incident in a pattern.
20.
4::ll U.S. 553 (1977). In Evans, the plaintiff was not given seniority credit
for her earlier service when she was rehired after being terminated under a discriminatory policy. The policy, which terminated stewardesses who became pregnant, was time barred. The loss of seniority resulting from the discharge was also
time-barred and was held to be an effect. According to the Court, "a challenge to a
neutral system may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past event which
has no present legal significance has affected the calculation of seniority credit,
even if the past event might at one time have justified a valid claim against the
employer." !d. at 560.
21.
490 U.S. at 908.
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discriminatory conduct, the modification circumvents the primary purpose underlying the continuing violation theory of
allowing a claimant to relate back his or her claim by showing
a pattern of discriminatory employment practices.
In practical terms, the "wholly dependent" concept makes
it more difficult for a plaintiff to rely on the continuing violation theory because the concept makes a plaintiff walk a very
fine line. On the one hand, a claimant must show that a pattern or policy of discrimination exists in order to come under
the continuing violation theory. On the other hand, the events
of discrimination need a certain level of disconnection or independence, or else the subsequent events could be deemed
"wholly dependent" on the initial discriminatory event, and
therefore non-actionable. 22
While the Act modifies many aspects of Lorance, as discussed later, the Act failed to expressly invalidate this new
verbal formulation of the continuing violation theory. The effect
of this omission is uncertain. It is conceivable that this portion
of Lorance may still be relied on by the courts in defining the
nature of the continuing violation theory. This would be unfortunate.

2.

Special treatment of seniority systems under section 706(h)

Having modified the continuing violation theory, the Court
next made seniority systems practically invincible against legal
challenges by deciding that the statute of limitations for a
seniority system is triggered by its adoption.
The Court reached this conclusion by emphasizing the
special treatment given to seniority systems by section 706(h).
In point of fact, however, the Court reliance on section 706(h) is
misplaced. Section 706(h) insures the validity of seniority systems that treat and compensate people differently when those
differences are related to experience and work assignments. In
other words, section 706(h) allows different treatment when

22.
A showing under this standard will also be difficult because a certain degree of dependency necessarily exists between all employment decisions. It is left,
therefore, to the manipulation of the courts to decide whether a subsequent employment decision is sufficiently related to a prior decision so as to rise to the
level of being "wholly dependent."
On the other hand, the word "wholly" might place sufficient limitations on this
standard. If focus is given to the word "wholly," then perhaps a simple showing of
some remote degree of independence would suffice. By showing independence, however, one still runs the risk of jeopardizing his or her continuing violation claim.
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there is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for doing so.
Relying on section 706(h) to validate differences based on discrimination, rather than merit, is wholly inconsistent with the
underlying purpose of Title VII and is a serious misreading of
section 706(h). The Court's ruling that the statute of limitations for seniority systems is only triggered at adoption makes
all actions, decisions, and practices made in connection with a
seniority system per se "dependent" actions. Under such a rule,
an employee can never rely on the continuing violation theory
in challenging employment decisions made pursuant to a seniority system.

3. Public policy underlying Lorance
In the final analysis, the majority, while mindful of the
tremendous liability facing companies and the interests of
workers benefitted, even unjustly, by seniority systems, elected
to leave some employees suffering discrimination without a
remedy. There is no question that workers, relying on seniority
systems for job security, have a valid interest. Likewise, there
is no question that declaring a long-standing seniority system
discriminatory would have a tremendous economic impact on
companies and would require restructuring seniority systems
mid-stream. But these concerns cannot justify the complete
disregard of the interests of discriminated employees. A better
balance must be struck.
C.

Universal Criticism of Lorance

Writers and politicians have almost universally criticized
the Lorance decision. 23 The criticism has centered primarily
on the difficult position in which Lorance places employees. 24
23.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 40(i)-(ii), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 136 CON<L
REC. H8045 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990); Sondra Hemeryck et al., Reconstruction,

Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and the
Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1990); Jeffery M. Fisher,
In the Wake of Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.: Interpreting Title VII's Statute
of Limitations {or Facially Neutral Seniority Systems, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 711
(1990).
Hemeryck expressed concerns with Lorance in this way:
24.
The Lorance decision alters the direction of Title VII law in
two significant respects and could prove extremely damaging
if not corrected by legislation. First, the decision adopts an
extremely broad interpretation of section 703(h) of the [sic]
Title VII, which provides special protections for seniority
plans, thus insulating many such plans from challenge [inso-

II

I
l

l
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1. Employees forced to jeopardize employment relations
Lorance forces fully informed and legally adept employees
to make a decision upon the adoption of a seniority system. The
employee can either file a claim within 180 days of adoption
and thereby jeopardize his relationship with his employer; or
let the 180 days go by, hoping that the system will not adversely affect him or her in the future.
2.

Speculative claims

Criticism has also pointed out the speculative nature of a
claim filed within 180 days of adoption. 25 Because Lorance
applies to facially neutral seniority systems, uncovering a discriminatory intent within the first 180 days is nearly impossible. A complaint filed with the EEOC within the first 180 days
would likely be incomplete and unpersuasive, but the speculative nature of the claim becomes even more of a hindrance if it
is filed in federal court, since it can be dismissed with prejudice.

3. Ripeness and standing
In order for a case to be heard by a federal court, the case
must be ripe and the plaintiff must have standing.:w Ripeness

far as the plan is facially neutral]. Second, the decision raises
questions about the Court's acceptance of the continuing violations doctrine that has played an important role in Title
VII litigation for almost two decades. While LorancP's rejection of this theory could be limited to cases involving seniority systems, the decision may have serious repercussions if its
disapproval of the continuing violation theory is allowed to
spread outside of this limited context.
Hemeryck, supra note 24, at 557-58. The comment goes on to criticize Lorance
from a public policy perspective "[since] Lorance will force employees to file premature and often unnecessary claims in order to preserve their rights," and suggests that "the Lorance rule will waste valuable judicial resources and further
strain an already overloaded administration system." !d. at 561-62. The comment
ends by pointing out that "Lorance presents a trap for unknowledgeable employees,
many of whom will be unaware that they must file a claim as soon as their employer adopts a new seniority system." !d. at 562-63.
25.
!d.
26.
Fisher points out the problem in this way:
The claims of employees subject to a facially neutral seniority
system involve future, speculative injuries which become distinct and palpable injuries when the seniority system concretely affects them. Therein lies the inconsistency inherent
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requires that there be a concrete issue of contention upon
which the parties have a stake in the outcome. Standing requires that the person bringing the lawsuit be a person sufficiently and directly injured by the defendant.
Lorance creates problems for a plaintiff since there may be
little if any evidence of injury or discriminatory intent within
the first 180 days of a facially neutral seniority system. A
plaintiffs case, therefore, will inevitably be dismissed for lack
of ripeness and/or standing if his claim is filed within the 180
day period. 27
Moreover, under Lorance, a plaintiff who eventually has a
ripe claim and who has suffered a direct and palpable injury
will be barred from bringing suit by the 180 day statute of
limitations, since, in most instances, the discriminatory intent
of the system is not discoverable within the 180 day period.
The plaintiff would, for all intents and purposes, be without a
remedy.

4.

Spreading of the Lorance rationale

Critics feared that Lorance's rationale of starting the statute of limitations upon the adoption of a policy or employment
practice would spread beyond seniority systems. These fears
were confirmed in Davis v. Boeing Helicopter Co. 28 and in
EEOC v. City Colleges of Chicago. 29
In Davis, the court held that a challenge of an allegedly

in the Lorance framework; it requires that employees challenge a discriminatory system within 180 days of its adoption, perhaps well before any individual suffers concrete harm
[constituting injury in fact] . . . .
Ripeness cases generally relate to speculative future harm
that courts are reluctant to hear until the controversy has
become concrete and focused . . . .
Under a strict interpretation of Lorance, plaintiffs' claims
will be time barred either because they have sued too early
and are barred from a decision on the merits because of the
jurisdictional requirements of standing and ripeness, or because they have sued to late and are barred by the statute of
limitations.
Fisher, supra note 24, at 731, 733-34.
27.
The only possible way to avoid this result would be to allow a generic
claim citing the possibility of future harm. This approach, however, would certainly
not please most courts since allowing a generic claim to be filed would circumvent
the entire purpose behind statutes of limitation.
28.
1990 WL 131539 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1990).
29.
944 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1991).
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discriminatory promotional policy must be made at the time
the policy was adopted rather than when the policy was applied
to deny a promotion to a claimant. In City Colleges of Chicago,
the same "adoption" rationale was used to bar an ADEA suit
challenging application of an early retirement plan. Congress
deliberately responded to this alarming trend by passing the
1991 Act.

D.

How the Act Modifies Lorance

Both the Republican Administration and the Democratic
leadership of Congress were in agreement on the need to invalidate Lorance, but they differed on how to replace it. 30 In
its final form, the Act most closely resembles the
Administration's version. Specifically, the Act adds the following paragraph to section 706(e) (now codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e) (1988)):
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice
occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been
adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this subchapter (whether or not that discriminatory
purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision),
when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual
becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or
provision of the system. 31

The Act leaves no doubt concerning the continuing viability of

Lorance. Lorance, insofar as seniority systems are concerned, is
dead.

1. Eliminating the distinction between facially neutral and
facially discriminatory seniority systems
Contrary to Lorance, the Act makes no distinction between
facially neutral and facially discriminatory seniority systems.
Eliminating the distinction makes sense. Employers, who are
as legally sophisticated as any single group, constitute a cross
section of society, and as such, include many who abhor dis-

30.
See supra note 23.
31.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992). The placement of this paragraph is interesting. Rather than being added to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988),
dealing with seniority systems, the paragraph was added to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-fi(e),
dealing with the time period within which a claim must be filed with the EEOC.

194

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 7

crimination as well as some who are biased. For those who so
desired, Lorance made discrimination easy. An employer only
had to make the seniority system neutral on its face and then
let the short statute of limitations run out. 32
Lorance, however, failed to recognize the fact that the
intent to discriminate was the same, whether the seniority
system was facially neutral or facially discriminatory. Likewise,
Lorance failed to recognize that, regardless of the language of
the system, the overall effect of a discriminatory seniority system on injured employees is essentially the same. The new Act
corrects this senseless distinction and makes the intention to
discriminate actionable, in spite of its window dressing. 33

2. Any provision of a seniority system
The new Act also states that Title VII violations may arise
from the discriminatory application of a seniority system or a
provision of such a system. Thus, a plaintiff, rather than showing that the whole seniority system violates Title VII, needs
only show that some part of it does.
The Act, however, fails to adequately clarify how this provision fits together with plaintiffs burden of showing that the
seniority system was "adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose."34 For example, must an employee only show
that an intent to discriminate existed as to a single provision of
the seniority system to successfully show the intent to discriminate, or must that employee show a predominant or underlying
motive to discriminate as to the whole seniority system?

32.
It would, of course, be more challenging to draft a facially neutral, yet discriminatory seniority policy, but such a task would not pose much of a problem for
imaginative employers.
One ironic aspect of Lorance is the fact that it permitted a facially discrim33.
inatory system to be challenged at anytime. This is ironic because a facially discriminatory system, since it is easier to recognize, is the only kind of seniority
system that is likely be challenged within 180 days of adoption. Although facially
neutral systems will now be subject to challenge after the 180 day period, facially
neutral systems will enjoy more protection than facially discriminatory systems
because a plaintiff will have the burden of showing that the seniority system or a
provision of it was adopted with the intent to discriminate. Such a showing will be
much more difficult when the intent to discriminate is not found on the face of the
seniority system. Thus, by requiring the showing of intent, the new Act accommodates some of the concerns implicitly expressed in Lorance.
34.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
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It seems overly burdensome and somewhat inconsistent to
require a plaintiff to show a predominant motive of intentional
discrimination as to the whole of the system, if the plaintiff is
only injured by the application of a single provision for which
she can prove the requisite intent.
While the wording of the Act appears unclear, a careful
reading suggests that an intent to discriminate can exist as to
a single provision. This understanding is gleaned from the
phrase "whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent
on the face of the seniority provision."35 This phrase seems to
indicate that a showing of a discriminatory purpose as to a
single provision is sufficient. 36

3. Three events constituting occurrences under§ 2000e-5(e)
The Act significantly adds to the concept of "occurrence."
The word "occurrence" is a term of art located in section
2000e-5(e). Section 2000-5(e) requires that a charge of discrimination be filed with the EEOC "within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." The word "occur," therefore, refers to the events which rise to the level of a
Title VII violation, triggering the statute of limitations.
According to the Act, "An unlawful employment practice
occurs when ... the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority
system or a provision of the system."37

a. Adoption of a seniority system. The first event
constituting an "occurrence," triggering the statute of limitations, is the adoption of the system. This meaning of "occurrence" was the only one recognized by the Court in Lorance.
b. Becoming subject to a seniority system. The second event constituting an "occurrence," triggering the statute of
limitations, is when a person becomes subject to the seniority
system. Congress demonstrated great insight when they incor35.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
36.
Under the Democratic version of the Act, an employee would only have to
show an intent to discriminate as to a single practice. That result is clearly expressed in the following language: "[ w )here . . . such system or practice was included in such agreement with the intent to discriminate . . . the application of
such system or practice . . . shall be an unlawful employment practice." 136
CONG. REc. 81020 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1980).
37.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
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porated this event. One of the greatest shortcomings of Lorance
is the effect it had of barring all claims of workers hired 180
days after the adoption of a seniority system. 38
The new Act not only covers new emplnyees, but also current employees who are transferred into or otherwise made
subject to a different seniority system of the company. Protecting current employees is wise because the interest of an employee in a particular seniority system should attach when they
become subject to that system.
The new Act also improves upon Lorance by ensuring that
a constant stream of opportunities exist for challenging a discriminatory seniority system. By giving workers the opportunity to challenge a seniority system each time a new person becomes subject to it, Congress has provided the means by which
the kinks and shortcoming of a discriminatory seniority system
can be phased out. This fine tuning is much more advantageous than Lorance's position of preserving entrenched seniority systems and all their defects.
c. Persons aggrieved by the application of a seniority
system. The third event constituting an "occurrence," triggering
the statute of limitations is "when a person aggrieved is injured
by the application of the seniority system or a provision of the
system."39 The key words upon which the meaning of this "occurrence" turn are "injured," "application," and "seniority system." These terms are discussed at length in the next section.

4. Core elements of a seniority system challenge
under the Act
This section explores the issue of when and under what
circumstances a claim can be brought under the Act's provisions. For the most part, this section outlines competing interpretations.
To begin with, it may help to characterize the provision in
this way: the injury suffered must be the type which occurs as
a result of a seniority system intentionally adopted for a discriminatory purpose. Stated this way, we understand that (1) a
seniority system must be in place; (2) the seniority system or a

38.
if the
or (3)
39.

Arguably, an employee's only options would be to (1) not join the company
discrimination was known, (2) stay on the job and endure the discrimination,
quit.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-fi(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
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provision of the system must have been intentionally adopted
for a discriminatory purpose; (3) an injury of discrimination has
occurred; and (4) the injury of discrimination was caused by the
discriminatory seniority system or a discriminatory provision.

a. Seniority system in place. Plaintiffs may find
treatment under the seniority system theory more favorable
than under the other theories of employment discrimination. 40
As a result, courts will have to develop rules describing what is
and what is not a seniority system. 41
To begin with, we know that a collective bargaining agreement is not a prerequisite for a seniority system, contrary to
the Democratic version of the Act which specifically required
that the seniority system be "part of a collective bargaining
agreement."42 Beyond this, however, little else is clear, since
"Title VII does not define the term 'seniority system,' and
[since] no comprehensive definition of the phrase emerges from
the legislative history."43
The best guidance for defining a "seniority system" is found
in California Brewers Association v. Bryant. 44 In Bryant, the
Court held that an employment practice giving greater benefits
to permanent employees than temporary employees and requiring a temporary employee to work at least 45 weeks in a single

40.
This is possible because § 112 of the new Act may make challenging a
seniority system easier than challenging employment discrimination under some
other theory.
41.
A broad definition of a seniority system could be any arrangement, no matter how informal, that takes into account the duration of employment in determining compensation and/or benefits. Examples of this could include an informal practice by a fast food restaurant of giving scheduling preferences to those workers
employed the longest.
42.
136 CoNe. REc. Sl020 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990). By limiting the section to
collective bargaining agreements, the Democrats were trying to strike a balance
between employers and employees. The Democrats reasoned that:
[m}ost employer practices, such as salary structures and work
rules, remain in effect indefinitely once adopted. but [sic}
when a seniority system is embodied in a collective bargaining agreement that is . . . in force for only a limited period . . . the system must be reestablished . . . by each contract that follows to continue in effect.
H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, at 62 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. fi49, 600. Thus stated, the Democratic version identified the need to
protect the financial underpinnings of businesses by limiting the situations in
which an entire employment system could be challenged.
43.
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. fi98, 60fi (1980).
44.
444 U.S. fi98 (1980).
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calendar year before becoming a permanent employee was a
seniority system for purposes of section 706(h).
The Bryant Court defined a seniority system in this way:
In the area of labor relations, "seniority" is a term that
connotes length of employment. A "seniority system" is a
scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-seniority criteria,
allots to employees ever improving employment rights and
benefits as their respective lengths of pertinent employment
increase. Unlike other methods of allocating employment
benefits and opportunities, such as subjective evaluations or
educational requirements, the principal feature of any and
every "seniority system" is that preferential treatment is
dispensed on the basis of some measure of time served in
employment. 45

As with all other claims of discrimination, deciding what is
or is not a seniority system will be a fact intensive inquiry. Beyond the definition given in Bryant, a court may also want to
consider the following factors in determining what constitutes a
seniority system: (1) the formality of the system,46 (2) the
prevalence of the system, 47 and (3) the expectations of the employees.48

b. Intentionally discriminatory purpose. There are a
couple of distinct issues that arise in connection with this element. First, does the intent to discriminate have to exist when
the seniority system was initially adopted, or is it sufficient if it
exists when it is actually applied with the intent to discriminate? Second, must the discriminatory intent exist as to the
whole of the system, or is it sufficient if it only exists as to a
discriminatory provision?49 Third, how far will courts go in
45.
Id. at 605-06.
46.
Evaluating the formality of a seniority system is helpful because it allows
an objective outsider to determine whether employees have a reasonable reliance
expectation in the seniority system, Things to consider when making this determination are: (1) Is there a writing evincing a seniority system? (2) Is each worker
made aware of an over-arching seniority plan? (;:1) are rules in place and are they
followed?
47.
This goes to the issue of whether a system is selectively used to benefit or
punish, or whether it is applied to all workers similarly situated.
48.
This is a subjective standard that evaluates the understanding of an individual worker. It asks whether an employee has a bona fide right of expectation in
a seniority system. Including this factor in the analysis is important because workers often don't see the whole picture; instead they see a picture painted by their
immediate supervisor.
The Democratic version of the Act would have cleared up these ambiguities.
49.
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inferring a discriminatory intent from circumstantial evidence?
( 1) Adoption or use? The Act tells us that in order for the section to apply we must have a "seniority system
that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose."50 Clearly, the wording of the Act seems to cover the initial adoption of a seniority system. Thus read, the Act seems to
imply that a seniority system must be somewhat formalistic
and that a conscious decision to incorporate or follow a seniority plan must be made. The Act's wording, however, also leaves
open the possibility of a second reading.

That second reading focuses more on the words "adopted
for an intentionally discriminatory purpose."51 By focusing on
this language, one might argue that the section applies whenever a seniority system is used to intentionally discriminate,
and not just when a seniority system is initially adopted to
intentionally discriminate.
The second reading allows an employee to challenge a
seniority system that is intentionally construed or manipulated
in such a way as to be discriminatory, regardless of whether
the seniority system was initially adopted for an intentionally
discriminatory purpose. This reading rightfully takes another
step forward in addressing the rights of employees. Why should
it matter whether the seniority system was initially adopted for
a discriminatory purpose, if subsequently it is used for such a
discriminatory purpose? The injury, after all, is exactly the
same.
My personal belief is that "when" the system is adopted is
not as important as how it is used. I believe that when a
company's top management, as opposed to middle management,
decides to use a seniority system for a discriminatory purpose
against certain employees, those employees should be able to
challenge the discriminatory use of that system. I make a distinction between top management and middle management for
the following reasons: (1) we are really interested in curing
defects at the highest levels, since a decision to discriminate
made at the highest levels will have the most far-reaching

First, the intent to discriminate must exist at the time it was included in a collective bargaining agreement, and second, the intent to discriminate can exist as to a
single provision.
50.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
51.
!d.
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effect on workers; (2) a middle manager can manipulate a seniority system for an improper purpose, even though top management has exercised due care in avoiding discrimination; (3)
the legal theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact
exist to protect workers in situations where a middle manager
intentionally discriminates against certain employees; and, (4)
circumstantial evidence, which will have to be relied on when a
challenge is made to a facially neutral seniority system, will
indicate whether the discriminatory use of a seniority system
has originated from top management or middle management,
based on whether the discrimination is prevalent or isolated.

(2) Whole system or any provision. This issue
was discussed in an earlier section. That section concluded that
a careful reading of the provision indicates that showing an intent to discriminate as to a single provision is sufficient under
the Act.
(3) Degree of circumstantial evidence. If something is not discriminatory on its face, the only way to prove
that it is discriminatory is through circumstantial evidence or
testimony from someone in management. Since this kind of
testimony is unlikely to surface, the degree to which courts will
be willing to infer the requisite intent through circumstantial
evidence will bear significantly on the vitality ofthis provision.
As with other issues, this issue requires that a proper balance
be struck between two extremes.
On the one hand, if courts refuse to accept any circumstantial evidence, then the Act will have done very little to improve
upon the rigidity and unfairness of Lorance. On the other hand,
if courts go too far in relying on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, then the focus of a court's inquiry will be
shifted from discriminatory intent to discriminatory impact.
The legal rules and evidentiary principles associated with a
claim for disparate treatment might be a good place to look for
answers regarding how these concerns might best be balanced.
Generally speaking, the courts have used a burden-shifting
approach in dealing with the issue of intent. A good example of
this approach is Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust. 52 In

52.

487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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Watson, the burden-shifting approach was explained m this
way:
[T]he plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a
discriminatory intent or motive. In order to facilitate the
orderly consideration of relevant evidence, we have devised a
series of shifting evidentiary burdens that are "intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual
question of intentional discrimination." Under that scheme, a
prima facie case is ordinarily established by proof that the
employer, after having rejected the plaintiff's application for a
job of promotion, continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff's. The burden of proving a prima
facie case is "not onerous," and the employer in turn may
rebut it simply by producing some evidence that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the decision. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of all the evidence in the case that
the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were a pretext
for discrimination. 53

Watson's burden-shifting approach, although slightly modified by the Act, may be helpful here. 54
c. Injury. An injury must occur to the individual
claimant. There are two aspects which a court may want to
consider when determining whether an injury has occurred.
The first aspect is the nature of the injury. The second aspect
is the severity of the injury.
As to the first, the injury claimed must be the type which
occurs as a result of a discriminatory seniority system. The
best way to determine whether an injury is the result of a
discriminatory system is to look at the types of practices pro

53.
54.

ld. at 986 (citations omitted).
S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1991).
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hibited by the Civil Rights Act55 and the closeness of the causal connection between the seniority system and the injury.
As to the second, any injury, if it is the type that occurs
from a discriminatory seniority system, will normally be sufficient to satisfy the element of injury. For example, under the
Fair Housing Act cases, the injury element of a prima facie
case is generally met if the plaintiff shows the injury required
for standing. 56 Therefore, the severity of an injury will only be
an issue of central importance when damages are considered.

d. Causation: Linking together the injury, the seniority system and the 180 day limitations period. Causation can be
thought of as the glue which joins all of the various elements
together. For a claim to be actionable, there must be a link
between the injury suffered and the seniority system that has
been intentionally adopted for a discriminatory purpose. The
seniority system, in other words, must cause the harm. In defining the kind of connection required, the courts will look to
the three triggering events. Of the three, the adoption of a
seniority system and becoming subject to a seniority system are
definite, one-time events that should be easy to apply here.

55.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
56.
See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979)
(deprivation of social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society
defined in terms of city blocks in suburban neighborhood rather than in apartment
buildings was sufficient injury); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972) (tenants' claimed lost benefits of living in an integrated world and harm
from being stigmatized as residents of a "white ghetto" came within the definition
of persons aggrieved). Compare this level of injury with the injury required for a §
1983 claim. See Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223 (fith Cir. 1988) (damages
are only available for breaches of state torts arising from police conduct that cause
meaningful injury, are grossly disproportionate to need presented, and are motivated by malice).
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The application of a seniority provision is much less clear.
Courts' interpretation of this "occurrence" will have a tremendous impact on the usefulness of the Act to discriminated employees. Application just might mean use; for example, a seniority system might be "applied" every time it is used or taken
into consideration when making paychecks or duty rosters. On
the other hand, application might be read narrowly so that a
seniority system could only be applied when a significant and
distinct employment decision has been made, such as a promotion, firing, or transfer. In light of the continuing violation
theory, discussed at length in the next section, it might be
advisable to embrace a more narrow reading.

5.

The continuing violation theory

The continuing violation theory is a judicial response that
counteracts the harsh results of the 180 day statute of limitations applied to Title VII claims. It is a highly complex, fact
specific inquiry.
Under the theory, a plaintiff who files a claim within 180
days of a Title VII violation can include related discriminatory
acts that occurred outside of the 180 day period. Permitting a
plaintiff to "relate back" enables him or her to recover damages
for all related events. Courts have also used the theory to connect violations occurring subsequent to the filing of a claim. 57
To come within the theory, a plaintiff must claim and prove
either a continuing pattern of discrimination or a policy of
discrimination.

a.

Pattern of discrimination or serial violation.

To
prove a continuing pattern of discrimination, or what some
circuits call a serial violation, 58 the plaintiff must show that

57.
See Anderson v. Block, 807 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1986).
5R.
In Mack v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1989), the
court defined a serial violation in this way:
What, then, is meant by the term "continuing violation?"
In one incarnation, the theory recognizes that some acts are
imbricated, i.e., they involve an interlinked succession of
related events or a fully-integrated course of conduct. Although the limitations clock generally starts with the commission of a discriminatory act, a true "continuing violation"
rewinds the clock for each discriminatory episode along the
way. Citations omitted. Thus, if the later violations in the
series are within the prescriptive period, an employee may
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the most recent act of a discriminatory pattern occurred within
the last 180 days. That act must constitute a new violation and
cannot simply be the effects 59 of a discriminatory practice that
occurred outside of the 180 day period. 60 A plaintiff cannot
use the continuing violation theory to resurrect claims concluded in the past, even though the violation's effects may persist.
The plaintiff must next show that the act occurring within
the 180 day period is the most recent act in a series of related
acts. The recurring acts must be reasonably close in time and
nature to constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination. The
plaintiff must show by a preponderance of evidence more than
the mere occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional
discrimination. 61 As a general rule, a claimant who has been

pursue them despite the fact that earlier acts, forming part
and parcel of the same pattern, have grown stale. Applying
this reasoning, we held in Cajigas v. Banco de Ponce, 741
F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1984), that although the primary discriminatory act of which plaintiff complained (a gender-based promotion) was time-barred, her action was nevertheless "timely
with respect to at least the alleged discriminatory refusal
[subsequently] to promote plaintiff to an available exeeutive
position for which she was qualified" and as to which the
limitations period remained open.
Id. at l8a (citations omitted).
59.
See Douglas Laycock, Continuing Violations, Disparate Impact in Compensation and Other Title VII Issues, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. fi3 (1986). The author
gives an insightful analogy to show the difference between a continuing effect and
a continuing violation. He states it this way:
If I run over a student with my car, the effects may last
for the rest of his life. If he is paralyzed, he will probably be
just as paralyzed ai age eighty as he was at age twenty. No
jurisdiction has ever thought he could sue me at any time in
that sixty-year period. My violation of the law would be over
in an instant of negligence, and the statute of limitations
would run from that instant. Whatever the moral force of the
argument that Congress should have tried to undo the effects
of past discrimination, that argument has no basis in continuing violation theory.
Id. at fi7.
60.
See, e.f?., Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); United
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 5fi3 (1977).
61.
In Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 7lfi F.2d
971 (fith Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986), the court discussed factors to be
considered when determining a claim under the continuing violation theory. The
court said:
This inquiry, of necessity, turns on the facts and context of each particular
case. Relevant to the determination are the following three factors, which we discuss but by no means consider to be exhaustive. The first is subject matter. Do
the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them
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denied hiring or has been terminated will find it difficult to
prove a continuing violation. 62
b. Policy of discrimination or systemic violation.63 A policy of discrimination, or what some circuits call a
systemic violation, may also constitute a continuing violation.
[In] contrast lto] a serial violation, a systemic violation need
not involve an identifiable, discrete act of discrimination transpiring within the limitations period .... A systemic violation has its roots in a discriminatory policy or practice; so
long as the policy or practice itself continues into the limitation period, a challenger may be deemed to have filed a timely
complaint. 64

in a continuing violation? The second is frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring
(e.g., biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated work assignment or
employment decision? The third factor, perhaps of most importance, is the degree
of permanence. Does the act have the degree of permanence which should trigger
an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights, or which should
indicate to the employee that the continued existence of the adverse consequences
of the act is to be expected without being dependent on a continuing intent to
discriminate.
!d. at 9Hl. See also Waltman v. International Paper Co., H7fi F.2d 46H (5th Cir.
l9H9) (applying the three prong Berry analysis).
62.
Ser>, P.g, CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL CoURTS, C-34 (1988). There are a
few exceptions to this rule. Take, for example, Roberts v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 6110 F.2d H2::l (6th Cir. 1981). In Roberts, the court recognized that a continuous refusal to hire can constitute a continuing and ongoing violation. This
result should be compared to a termination which is usually viewed as a one-time
event, incapable of being linked by a continuing violation theory. Allowing a person
to apply for a job in order to create an event within the 180 day period and then
use the that event to link back to past events, creates a significant opportunity for
abuse. An example of a court finding a termination to be a continuing violation is
Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610 (lOth Cir. 1988).
63.
See, e.!J., Thelma A. Crivens, The r:ontinuin!{ Violation Theory arui Systemic
Discrimination: In Search o{ a Judicial Standard for Timely Filing, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 1171 (198H) (suggests that there are three judicial standards of timeliness
under Title VII, which are: (1) date-of-notification/injury standard, (2) manifestation/enforcement standard, (3) on going policy standard).
64.
Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 523 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). In
Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir.
1989), the court explained: "The continuing violation theory generally has been applied in the context of a continuing policy and practice of discrimination on a company wide basis; a plaintiff who shows that a policy and practice operated at least
in part within the limitation period satisfies the filing requirements." ld. at 1480.
[A) systematic policy of discrimination is actionable even if
some or all of the events evidencing its inception occurred
prior to the limitations period. The reason is that the continuing system of discrimination operates against the employee
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The reasoning of this rule, at least in promotional settings,65 has been explained in this way: "[A] challenge to systematic discrimination is always timely if brought by a present
employee, for the existence of the system deters the employee
from seeking his full employment rights or threatens to adversely affect him in the future." 66
The court in Williams v. Owens-Illinois ,67 recognized that
the systemic discrimination theory has limitations depending
on the kind of practice involved. In Williams, the court explained:
A refusal to hire or a decision to fire an employee may place
the victim out of the reach of any further effect of company
policy, so that such a complainant must file a charge within
the requisite time period after their refusal to hire or termination, or be time-barred. If in those cases the victims can
show no way in which the company policy had an impact on
them within the limitations period, the continuing violation
doctrine is of no assistance or applicability, because mere

and violates his or her rights up to a point in time that falls
within the applicable limitations period. Such continuing violations are most likely to occur in the matter of placements
or promotions.
Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
971 (1982) (citations omitted).
65.
In Higgins v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Sec.
Comm'n, 642 F.2d 1199 (lOth Cir. 1981), the court found that an action alleging a
discriminatory promotion practice was timely filed even though there were no
available promotions for Higgins within the 180 days of filing his charge. The court
relied on Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 833 (lOth Cir. 1975), in which
the court held, "Discriminatory failure to promote [is] a continuing violation for
purposes of Title VII filing requirements so long as the plaintiff is alleging such
nonpromotion over a period of time." ld. at 1200.
66.
Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 7.57, 761 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing
Elliot v. Sperry Rand Corp, F.R.D. 580, 586 (D. Minn. 1978)). A variation of this
argument was also expressed in Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610
(lOth Cir. 1988). In Gray, the court rejected a continuing violation theory of terminated employees. The court rejected the claim because:
When an employee is terminated, the employment relationship ends; and the fear of reprisal and the reasons for allowing employees to claim a continuing discriminatory policy are
removed. Moreover, if former employees were allowed to assert charges after 180 days had passed from the date of
termination, the purpose of the statute of limitations would
be undermined and employers could be exposed to unlimited
suits.
ld. at 614.
67.
665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1982).
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'continuing impact from past violations is not actionable. Continuing violations are.' 68

Some of the circuits, in contrast to those circuits that only
require current employment and current application of the
policy, require the plaintiff to show that the discriminatory
policy in question was actually applied to that plaintiff during
the 180 day period. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has held
that
to establish a continuing violation, a plaintiff must show some
application of the illegal policy to him (or to his class) within
the 180 days preceding the filing of his complaint. (Citations
omitted). Just as there can be no negligence in the air, so the
existence of a quiescent discriminatory policy is simply insufficient to toll the statute of limitations. To hold to the contrary would expose employers to a virtually open-ended period
of liability and would, as we said, read the statute of limitations right out of existence. 69

c. Which doctrine applies? The threshold question
that must be asked here is which doctrine of the continuing
violation theory should apply to seniority systems. Adopting the
systemic, policy discrimination doctrine for seniority systems is
the common sense answer to this question because a seniority
system is probably the first thing a person thinks of when
asked to name an employment policy.
On the other hand, an argument can be made that a seniority system should fall under the pattern of discrimination
doctrine since discriminatory practices under a seniority system
could easily be considered a pattern or series of related events,
and there is no bright line test distinguishing patterns from
policies.
Because courts may apply either continuing violation doctrine, it is necessary to examine what an employee would have
to prove under each doctrine.
( 1) Systemic, policy discrimination. Under the
discriminatory policy doctrine, a claimant can attack and collect damages that have arisen since the inception of a seniority

6R.
69.

!d. at 924 (citations omitted).
Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 5::1::1-34 (5th Cir. 1986).
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system if the following conditions are met: the claimant is a
current employee; the discriminatory policy adversely affected
the claimant at some time; and the discriminatory policy is still
in effect. In those circuits requiring it, a claimant will also need
to show that the discriminatory event occurred within the 180
day period.

(2) Discriminatory pattern. Under the discriminatory pattern doctrine, a claimant will have to prove that an
incident of discrimination has occurred within the 180 day
period and that the incident is part of a pattern of discrimination. The relative ease or difficulty of making this showing will
depend on how the concepts of "incident or injury" and "pattern
of discrimination" are interpreted by the courts.
(a) "Incident or injury." Under a broad reading, "incident or injury" could mean any recurring effect of a
discriminatory seniority system. For example, if a seniority
system affected a person's pay, then each paycheck received
could be considered an incident or injury. This would be consistent with equal pay cases that consider each paycheck to be
a new violation. Likewise, if a seniority system affected a
worker's schedule, then every day worked pursuant to such
system would constitute a new injury.
On the other hand, a court may give the provision a more
narrow reading. Under a narrow reading, only decisions impacting an employee's status would be considered an incident
or injury. Thus, an injury or incident would only occur at the
time a decision was made as to an employee's compensation,
work schedule, demotion, transfer or termination.
In short, a broad reading of injury or incident would focus
on recurring affects of a status-changing decision, while a narrow reading of it would focus on the status-changing decision
itself.

(b) Pattern of discrimination. The concept of
"pattern of discrimination" can also be read broadly or narrowly. A broad reading would lump all decisions and effects of a
seniority system into one category. Thus, any employment related decision made pursuant to a seniority system would be a
part of the discriminatory pattern, no matter how different the
employment actions might be.
A narrow reading would compartmentalize employment
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injuries into different groups of employment decisions. Accordingly, an employee seeking to establish a pattern of discrimination as to transfers could not rely on evidence of other kinds
of employment discrimination.

d. Likely impact of the continuing violation theory. As mentioned above, the continuing violation theory is a
judicial response to the harsh results of the 180 day statute of
limitations. Arguably, the continuing violation theory as applied to seniority systems should be scaled back since Congress
has significantly reduced the harshness of the short limitation
period. If either the discriminatory pattern doctrine or the discriminatory policy doctrine is applied, seniority systems will be
under all out attack since a claimant will find it relatively easy
to relate back and link up all of his or her claims of discrimination. 70 If this happens, the statute of limitations and the objectives that underlie it might become meaningless.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This paper has introduced and discussed some of the issues
the judiciary will face in applying the Civil Rights Act of 1991
to seniority systems. In contrast to Lorance's one-sided weighing of interests, it is my hope that the judiciary will adequately
take into account the interests of all relevant parties in deciding these critical employment issues.

R. Chet Loftis

70.
The potential effect becomes even greater when this doctrine is coupled
with the discovery strand of equitable tolling, allowing for the tolling of the statute
of limitations until the discriminatory purpose is discoverable. It should also be
noted that the legislative history suggests that:
What [the seniority system amendment] does not do is affect
existing law with respect to the "continuing violation" theory.
Instead, this subsection of the legislation addresses discriminatory employment rules and decisions in their first application after adoption by the employer.
The "continuing violation" theory generally arises
where the employer's continuing conduct or pattern of ongoing
discrimination causes multiple or repeated injuries to members of groups protected under the statute.
H.R. REI'. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 at 2;:l (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 716-17.

